In the course of studying the meaning ing institutionalized' -for those who live within places like nursing homes (G 1975, 1980) , residential treatment centers (Buckholdt and Gubrium 1979) , and rehabilitation hospitals (Gubrium and Buckholdt 1982) ;
for those who care for the institutionalized; and for the families whose members experience institutionalization-we repeatedly encountered questions of real and fictive kinship. The questions concerned the everyday issue of how, among a variety of direct or indirect, common or uncommon claimants, family status is assigned in the care, treatment, and informal relations of institutionalized persons, together with its ensuing rights, obligations, and sentiments. This paper deals with four general aspects of the issue based on the field data: (1) family's link with kinship, (2) family's everyday meaning, (3) the mundane grammar of fictive family, and (4) analytic and human service considerations in treating the family fictively. At first blush, to be family seems to readily imply kinship, that is, biological or quasi-biological linkages between people. What the kinship system is precisely seems not to be as much a limiting condition on family status as an assumed state of kinship. Everyday usage suggests, however, that kinship is only a first approximation to family. To ask someone who is meant by "family" is not necessarily to reveal how the term is used in everyday living. While for many the term "family" is formally conceived as signifying kinship status, and indeed kinship may be an implicit first rule for its assignment, in application the term is not limited to kindred.
The residents, staff members, families, and a variety of outsiders observed at Murray Manor (Gubrium 1975 ) and other nursing homes; at Cedarview, a residential treatment center for emotionally disturbed children (Buckholdt and Gubrium 1979) ; and at Wilshire, a physical rehabilitation hospital (Gubrium and Buckholdt 1982) , speak of family both in terms of kinship and in opposition to it. It is recognized that "family" is a way to describe any social relationship that has, or is claimed to have, special characteristics. It is not unusual for, say, a nursing home patient to gossip about his or her kin, on the one hand, and to refer to others as his or her real family, on the other. Cedarview children, too, frequently refer to, and indeed, lay claims to, family status on select staff members like cottage workers, whom they invidiously compare to their own mothers and fathers, denigrating the latter's parentage. Staff members commonly encounter the issue of who, among clients' acquaintances, they might best treat as family, notwithstanding their differential kinship.
While we encountered family as something to be assigned, its status in the lives of those concerned with it was not merely rhetorical. Patients, staff members, and acquaintances did not see themselves, speak about, or act as if the issue were just a matter of definition or a clash over wording. Who the family was to be had concrete consequences for their actions and planning. For example, to select nonkin as family among differentially related claimants to family status toward an elderly stroke victim, about to be discharged from a nursing home, presents staff members with the burden of dealing with the "real" family and their legal ties to the patient. Although the family issue was the occasional focus of glib references to what "you have to learn to call people sometimes" and complaints about "all these matters of definition," it was also evident that the assignment process, while definitional, was articulated through people's ongoing concrete activities. It was quite apparent at times how deeply it penetrated patients', staff members', and others' sentiments as they beamed over being accepted as family or became enraged with disclaimers to their familial assumptions.
Nor did we find that kinship was related to family only as a first rule. In use, kinship was both a first assignment rule and used as a confirming ground for familial assignment. For example, family status was conferred by an elderly mother on her daughters, as she introduced them, saying, "These are my two girls, my daughters Helen and Mary. They're a wonderful family to have." In her broken English, the mother then added, "Thanks to God for all the sons and daughters, yeah. To not have a family is something missing in life." With this, the mother confirmed the rule linking kinship with family. Her daughters (kin) were, "thanks to God," a wonderful family, which was, in turn, what one did not possess in the absence of children. When kin are considered to be family, kinship serves as a confirmation of what is believed kindred can and rightfully should be.
However, when kin are not family, the rule does not disappear. Rather, exceptions to it are recognized. In this way, it continues to serve as a first rule for recognizing family or claiming family status.
The kinship rule not only reciprocally serves to approximately locate family and to confirm the existence or absence of family ties. The language of kinship may be used in any assignment of family status. When kindred are considered to be family, of course, they are readily described as, say, mothers, fathers, sons, and daughters. But the same occurs when nonkin are assigned family status. For example, a distinction is made by staff members between a patient's wife and his "real" wife, wherein the former is related to the man but the latter is considered to be family.
FAMILY'S EVERYDAY MEANING
What special characteristics are signified by the term "family" as such, separate from kinship? On the occasion of a Cedarview staffing, when a social worker explained to a boy's speech therapist that the boy's foster parents were "as we all can see, the only real family he's ever had," the speech therapist challenged the assessment and, in the process, one of the family's special characteristics was revealed. Well, I haven't seen much of that.
Speech therapist: You're damn right she's concerned. I'd go further than that. ...
While the conversation did not end here, the excerpt suggests that one hallmark of family is that those assigned the status show concern for whomever they are considered to be family. As this and other challenges to the assignment of family status suggest, there is little disagreement over the sense of family and its particular attributes. As the social worker put it, "So the mother shows concern," an attribute taken for granted by both social worker and speech therapist. However, what is also clear in the excerpt is that to have a common understanding of the sense of something does not settle the issue of who or what is to be understood as such.
Indeed, the very end of the excerpt indicates that the speech therapist and social worker are launching into what will become an extended exchange over conflicting evidence of concern.
To be family also means that those to whom the term applies are truly concerned for each other. When staff members, for example, turn to family for support, information, or planning, the staff assumes that the latter will be genuinely interested in, and commit themselves to, a patient's welfare. An unconcerned or unenthusiastic family makes it reasonable to ask, "Is this a family or isn't it?" or "What kind of family is this anyway?" Staff members distinguish between those who, related or not, "just go through the motions" and those who are sincerely concerned. For example, though a quadriplegic patient's girlfriend may dutifully visit him at the rehabilitation hospital, it may not be enough to gain her genuine family status in staff members' eyes, even with the patient's persistent claims to the contrary.
Genuine concern is not just a matter of attentive responsibility. An acquaintance who regularly visits the hospital and who takes responsibility for the patient's household and community affairs, but who is perceived as doing this with no evident feeling, is considered not to be acting quite like family. I unusual to hear staff members, from education teachers to social workers and physical therapists, refer to kindred as "just going through the motions." While such relatives might accomplish some of the functions thought to be a family's responsibility, their "hearts" are said not to be in it. Such a family might be perfectly capable of attending to the technical side of responsibility, but they are not considered to be "reaching out" to the client. The openness of concern further specifies the mean- Claims for and against family status are continually subject to new evidence and reinterpretation. In time, an acquaintance may be seen by one staff member as "family after all" but continue to be discounted as such by other therapeutic personnel. A patient may become more firmly convinced of select acquaintances' genuine care and concern as therapists become more entrenched in the opposite point of view.
New evidence brought to a multidisciplinary teams' attention by a social worker may entirely recast the meaning of the teams' knowledge of the ostensible facts in the question of authentic concern for a disturbed child. In relating to clients' acquaintances, staff members take into account what they currently "know" the latter's familial status to be and, accordingly, organize their approaches and responses to them. To take for granted the meaning of family and its relation to kindred and other formal ties glosses over its ongoing practical usage and transformations.
FAMILY GRAMMAR
Social scientists routinely treat family c gorically, describing relevant relationshi either familial or nonfamilial. Further distinctions may of course be made, such as subcategorizing families into nuclear or extended.
Everyday usage suggests, however, that family grammar has a more complex metric.
Consider the following scene and slice of conversation. A routine psychiatric staffing is being conducted at Cedarview, a residential treatment center for emotionally disturbed children (Buckholdt and Gubrium 1979) . In attendance are a treatment team (special education teacher, social worker, child-care worker, and speech therapist), a consulting psychiatrist, and supervisory personnel. The proceedings concern the semiannual assessment of a child's progress in treatment. Questions at issue are whether foster care should be sought for the child upon discharge, whether the child's natural parents are competent enough to care for him, and whether the institution should enter into custody proceedings. Participants now are deliberating parental competence. In this short excerpt, we hear several references to family. Two "families"'" genuine concern for Tommy Harrington's welfare are under consideration. Both had been presented earlier in the staffing as candidates for real family status, a categorical distinction. But at one point in the excerpt, a child care worker suggests that the mother is more of a parent than her husband is. This changes the metric from a nominal to an ordinal one. Tommy's teacher elaborates the social worker's assessment, adding that when Tommy resided with the foster parents, "he had more of a family than he's ever had in his life." Again the metric is ordinal.
Family is something that is described not only in terms of whether particular relationships are categorically distinct, but also in terms of the intensity of their defining characteristics.
When the social worker speaks again, concurring with the teacher's assessment, the metric changes once more. The social worker explains that she believes Tommy's natural parents are not a full-fledged family. While they may be a natural biological complement, they are concluded to be less than half a family.
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The metrics displayed in the foregoing cerpt are not exceptions. To speak of the gories "family" and "not family," to co the familial intensity of certain relation and to identify precise magnitudes of f status, is to speak a mundane language tients, staff members, and acquaintan make references and respond to family tal facility across the metrics. No one cor anyone else in this regard. In everyday consulting psychiatrists and psychologi hered to the same grammar as nurses, workers, speech therapists, and other r caretakers. While persons corrected each about, concurred over, and disputed who be assigned or denied family status, or gra measure of it, the respective corrections, c mations, and disagreements concerned t ject of assignment, not the proper langu which it was to be conferred. Responding content of references to family in ki degree, and in magnitude is taken t natural way of speaking. (Interestingly grammar is usually ignored in the soci behavioral sciences, a point to which w return later.)
Even the existence of absolute zero poses no grammatical problem in everyday talk.
Whether someone states that, as far as he or she is concerned, certain individuals are "no family at all," or that an elderly man's nephew is "three times, no, four times, the family his own children are to him," it is taken for granted by both speaker and listener that the complete absence of family is meaningful. Indeed, in usage, the zero point is not just the metrical convenience it is in so-called interval scales. there is agreement at other times, about who is assigned the status "absence of family" or about who shall serve as a standard for familial comparisons. For example, a staff member's reference to a well-known family as real family and to another, equally well-known, as "no family at all," might be challenged as inappropriate instances of the standards implied. While there is certainty about the existence of a state of "not being family at all," its display is contingent on who is involved in specifying standards and on the particular concern at hand, in which it is considered important to know just how much family someone is or is not. In response to the claim that the extended family has all but disappeared in Western urban and industrial societies (Parsons and Bales 1955) , a number of social scientists have offered evidence of persistent networks of formal familial relations that serve to maintain the material and emotional well-being of their members. Litwak (1960a,b) and Sussman and Burchinal (1962) , for example, have shown how prevalent the extended family is in fact and, as the latter two suggest, seems to be an unheralded resource in contemporary family functioning. More recently, Shanas (1979) has presented data revealing that family networks serve as a survival structure for their elderly members, among other outcomes making it possible for elders to live outside institutions upon becoming disabled. Yet, whatever the survival benefits of the recently "discovered" family networks, the conventional, formal interpretation of family persists. What seems to have been discovered is more of the formal family, not a different means for understanding its everyday substance and organization. To limit the understanding of family life to formal kinship is to shortchange its routine complications, a richness that extends to seemingly unnoticed family claims and assignments.
It is perhaps a distinguishing quality of Western urban and industrial societies that everyday family usage is not coincident with formal kinship. The sociological and anthropological vision of familial relationships, in contrast, largely has been informed by evidence of their coincidence. The vision, in turn, seems to have focused research interests on corroborating grounds. A tacit "coincidence theory" has worked, in effect, to reveal family in kinship, however complicated the latter may have been shown to be from one society to another. The evidence for fictive family is now extensive enough to entertain a noncoincident understanding of family forms and family living.
There are exceptions of course, as we mentioned earlier, but the exceptions do not as much appear within the proper bounds of the family literature as they do within other literatures like minority studies and the social organization of prison life. The ensuing literary fragmentation tends to support the persistent research vision of family as a matter of formal kinship.
Studies that do describe fictive family locate its organizational source in the adaptation of members to environmental conditions such as impoverishment and incarceration. Our data show that there are additional sources of fictive family claims and assignments, like the human service personnel whose professional business is to deal with clients' family affairs. Family relations and family matters are routine features of treatment and care in institutions like nursing homes, hospitals, and residential treatment facilities which, perhaps because of the more focused containment function of prison staffs, enhances the former's sources of fictive family.
Fictive family, then, is not only adaptational but also a feature of the organization of work concerning family affairs.
As for human service itself, the recognition of fictive family as an expansion on the ostensible supports of formal kindred provides a wider network of available resources for aiding and treating clients. This is being recognized in the growing concern for what are called "support systems" (Butler and Lewis 1982) . Indeed, this was apparent in the rehabilitation facility studied by Gubrium and Buckholdt (1982) . Staff members were beginning to formalize a concern for what they spoke of and recorded as "significant others," which referred to acquaintances-kin or nonkin -who could be treated as responsible parties in the maintenance of a client's welfare. Formal recognition of fictive families would lend routine institutional support to what is informally recognized yet sometimes organizationally discouraged.
Notes
